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I. INTRODUCTION 
After forty years in the United States, a resident alien named Jose 
Padilla faces deportation because he pled guilty to three drug charges, 
including a felony drug trafficking charge.1 After learning that he 
would be deported because of the convictions, Padilla sought to 
change his plea by claiming that he had only pled guilty because his 
appointed attorney told him that the guilty plea would not affect his 
immigration status.2 Padilla’s claim that his attorney’s gross misadvice 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel highlights a 
quandary within Sixth Amendment law: does the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel set standards for the advice attorneys give criminal 
clients about the collateral consequences of plea agreements and, if 
so, is the standard for failure to advise different from affirmative 
misadvice? In Padilla v. Kentucky,3 the Supreme Court will address 
that question and, in doing so, help decide if Jose Padilla can remain 
in the United States. 
II. FACTS 
Jose Padilla is facing deportation because he pled guilty to three 
drug crimes.4 Prior to his arrest, Padilla was a legal resident in the 
United States working as a commercial truck driver.5 In September 
 * 2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Brief for the Petitioner at 8–10, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009). 
 2. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
 3. Padilla, No. 08-651 (U.S. argued Oct. 13, 2009). 
 4. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 5. Id. at 8. 
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2001, Padilla was stopped by police officers for failing to display a 
weight and distance tax ID on his truck.6 Padilla consented to a 
search of the truck and officers uncovered over 1,000 pounds of 
marijuana.7 Padilla was indicted by a grand jury on four charges, 
including felony trafficking in marijuana.8 Before trial, the 
prosecution offered Padilla a deal in which he would plead guilty to 
felony trafficking in marijuana and the two misdemeanor drug 
charges and they would recommend a sentence for Padilla of five 
years in prison and fiv 9
According to Padilla, he pleaded guilty because his appointed 
lawyer assured him that he “did not have to worry” about deportation 
because he had lived in the United States for more than forty years.10 
The trial court accepted the proposed agreement on October 4, 
2002.11 Two years after he pleaded guilty, Padilla filed a pro se motion 
to vacate his conviction.12 In it, he claimed that his lawyer violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by giving him incorrect 
advice on the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.13 
The trial court denied Padilla’s motion, holding that the defendant 
did not have to be educated on all possible consequences of his guilty 
plea in order for it to be valid.14 On appeal, the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that although 
attorneys do not have to educate their clients on all possible 
consequences in order for the pleas to be valid under the Sixth 
Amendment, they cannot give such advice incorrectly.15 The court 
held that, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, there is a difference 
between failure to advise and affirmative misadvice. The 
Commonwealth of Kentucky appealed the ruling to the state supreme 
 6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Padilla, No. 
08-651 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2009). 
 7. See id. at 2–3 (discussing the attempt by Padilla’s defense counsel to suppress the 
evidence uncovered by the search; the trial court eventually found that both the consent and 
search were valid). 
 8. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 11. 
 13. Id. at 11 (explaining that Padilla requested an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether his guilty plea was prejudiced by his attorney’s incompetence). 
 14. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 15. Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, *7 (Ky. 
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) (distinguishing counsel’s misadvice on collateral consequences from the 
lack of advice). 
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court.16 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Sixth Amendment seeks to ensure that a defendant in a 
criminal case is provided with counsel who advises the defendant on 
the consequences of a conviction that are relevant to the criminal 
prosecution. When a criminal defense lawyer advises a defendant to 
plead guilty, the courts are generally concerned with the voluntariness 
of the defendant’s plea. The Supreme Court, in Brady v. United 
States17 and Boykin v. Alabama,18 established that a plea may be 
considered voluntary as long as the defendant knows the direct 
consequences of conviction and understands the righ
If a defendant claims that his attorney’s ineffective assistance led 
him to plead guilty, he must satisfy the test established in Strickland v. 
Washington.19 The Strickland test considers whether counsel acted 
incompetently and, if so, whether counsel’s incompetence prejudiced 
the defendant by rendering the plea involuntary.20 
The Supreme Court has never determined whether misadvice on 
collateral consequences can be the basis of a Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The closest that the Supreme 
Court has come to addressing this issue is Hill v. Lockhart.21 In Hill, a 
criminal defendant claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had been violated when his lawyer misadvised him on parole 
eligibility.22 The Court found that the defendant had not shown that 
his lawyer’s advice prejudiced him.23  Consequently, it declined to 
address whether the defendant’s lawyer was ineffective by 
misadvising the defendant on the collateral consequence of parole 
eligibility.24 
Without direction from the Supreme Court on this issue, federal 
and state courts have developed a doctrine of limited exception for 
 16. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 17. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (finding that only an understanding of 
direct consequences is necessary for a defendant to provide a voluntary guilty plea). 
 18. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (establishing that a trial court must confirm 
with the defendant on the record that the defendant understands the direct consequences of a 
guilty plea and the constitutional rights it waives). 
 19. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 53–55. 
 23. Id. at 60. 
 24. Id. 
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misadvice on collateral consequences. Currently, all of the Federal 
circuits and twenty-one states allow defendants whose lawyers 
misadvised them on the collateral consequences of their guilty pleas 
to use the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to challenge the 
voluntariness of their pleas.25 This doctrine does not alter or contest 
the norm that a defendant must only understand the direct 
consequences of a guilty plea for it to be considered voluntary;26 it 
does, however, develop a Sixth Amendment standard for advice a 
defense lawyer chooses to give regarding collateral consequences. 
The federal and state courts that have encountered this issue have 
adopted different interpretations of the Sixth Amendment’s standard 
for advice on collateral consequences. Some jurisdictions have held 
that the Sixth Amendment imposes a general standard that misadvice 
on collateral consequences may constitute a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel if the misadvice was a material component in the 
decision to plead guilty.27 Other jurisdictions have been unwilling to 
interpret the Sixth Amendment as setting out a general standard for 
advice on collateral consequences, but have held that misadvice on 
collateral immigration consequences may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.28 
Many of the federal circuit courts began establishing a Sixth 
Amendment standard on misadvice about collateral consequences in 
 25. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008) (listing cases that 
have concluded that gross misadvice of a collateral consequence may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 26. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009). 
 27. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484. See also Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility may be cause for ineffective assistance 
of counsel); Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A]lthough defendant need 
not be informed of the details of his parole eligibility, ‘misinformation may be more vulnerable 
to constitutional challenge than mere lack of information.’”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 
65 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that gross misadvice by a defendant’s lawyer concerning parole 
eligibility may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 28. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484–85 (citing several cases upholding misadvice exception). 
See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that affirmative 
misrepresentation of deportation consequences qualifies as ineffective assistance of counsel 
where counsel represented himself as an expert in immigration law yet did not recommend to 
the sentencing judge a sentence two days shorter to ensure that his client was not deported); 
United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirmative misrepresentation 
regarding immigration consequences is deficient according to the first prong of the Strickland 
test for reasonable effectiveness); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539–41 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (finding affirmative misrepresentation regarding immigration consequences, coupled 
with likelihood that petitioner would be imprisoned and executed after deportation, could be 
ineffective assistance); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 935 (Utah 2005) (holding that 
counsel is not required to advise on deportation consequences of a guilty plea, but recognizing 
the exception for when counsel affirmatively misadvises a client on such consequences). 
2009] PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 97 
 
cases that involved misadvice regarding parole eligibility.29 For 
instance, in Sparks v. Sowders, the Sixth Circuit held that a defense 
lawyer’s incorrect advice to a client that he must plead guilty to be 
eligible for parole may have violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and raised legitimate questions about 
whether the defendant entered into the plea agreement voluntarily.30 
According to Sparks, an affirmative act of gross misadvice regarding 
the collateral consequence of parole eligibility may constitute a claim 
for post-conviction relief.31 
Commonwealth v. Padilla was the first case before the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky that presented the question of whether misadvice 
on a collateral consequence could amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Before Padilla, Commonwealth v. Fuartado was the only 
collateral consequences case that Kentucky’s supreme court had 
heard.32 In Fuartado, the Kentucky court held that a criminal defense 
attorney’s failure to advise on collateral consequences, such as 
deportation, did not constitute a claim for a Sixth Amendment 
violation.33 
Given that Fuartado only treated the issue of failing to advise, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals found Padilla’s claim that misadvice on 
collateral consequences violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was one of first impression.34 Consequently, it looked to the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sparks, and held that the misadvice Padilla 
received could constitute a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.35 
IV. HOLDING 
In Commonwealth v. Padilla, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held 
that misadvice on a collateral consequence of a guilty plea can never 
be the basis for a Sixth Amendment claim.36 In doing so, the majority 
held that an affirmative act of misadvice on collateral consequences is 
 29. Sparks, 852 F.2d at 885. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005). 
 33. See id. at 386 (defendant alleging that defense counsel’s failure to advise him on the 
potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea to marijuana trafficking constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 34. Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *7 
(Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
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no different than the failure to advise on collateral consequences.37 
Because it held that misadvice on collateral consequences is the same 
as failing to advise, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that it 
was bound to follow Commonwealth v. Fuartado.38 
The court maintained this position even after acknowledging that 
a number of jurisdictions regarded misadvice and failure to advise on 
collateral consequences as different with regard to Sixth Amendment 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.39 Though it recognized that 
several jurisdictions had held that affirmative misadvice regarding 
collateral consequences could be the basis of a Sixth Amendment 
claim,40 the Kentucky court ultimately concluded that it was obligated 
to follow the rationale of Fuartado. Because Fuartado held that 
advice on collateral consequences is not within the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Kentucky court concluded that misadvice on 
collateral consequences is also outside the scope of a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.41 
In dissent, Justice Cunningham argued that Fuartado’s holding did 
not prevent the court from finding that the Sixth Amendment 
imposed a standard on attorneys who choose to advise their clients on 
collateral consequences.42 The dissent declared that “[c]ounsel who 
gives erroneous advice to a client which influences a felony conviction 
is worse than no lawyer at all,” and proposed that lawyers should 
admit lack of knowledge rather than give erroneous advice.43 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Kentucky Supreme Court should have differentiated between 
the failure to advise illustrated in Fuartado and the misadvice present 
in Padilla. A defendant in a criminal case deserves accurate advice in 
order to ensure that his plea is voluntary. Advice should be accurate 
for both direct and collateral consequences, even if the lawyer is not 
required to provide advice on collateral consequences. The questions 
presented by Fuartado and Padilla are sufficiently distinct to justify 
the establishment of a holding on misadvice regarding collateral 
consequences. The Kentucky court’s disregard of the widely-
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 484. 
 40. Id. at 484–85. 
 41. Id. at 485. 
 42. Id. (Cunningham, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. 
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recognized distinction between claims based on a failure to advise and 
claims based on misadvice is problematic.44 
In the space of one paragraph, the Kentucky court applied the 
Fuartado rationale to foreclose Sixth Amendment claims based on 
misadvice on collateral consequences.  This leap in reasoning lacks a 
sufficient legal explanation and is especially startling since almost all 
jurisdictions that have treated this issue have determined that 
misadvice may support a defendant’s claim of a Sixth Amendment 
violation.45 
By almost any fair reading of the facts in Padilla and Fuartado, 
Padilla’s claim of misadvice was one of first impression for the court 
and the court was not bound by its holding in Fuartado. The court’s 
reliance on Fuartado would have been more appropriate if Padilla’s 
claim had focused solely on his counsel’s failure to advise him on the 
possible deportation consequences of his guilty plea.46 Instead, Padilla 
specifically inquired about the deportation consequences and his 
counsel dispensed erroneous advice.47 The supreme court should have 
recognized this, and realized that Fuartado’s holding did not 
determine whether the Sixth Amendment set a standard for the 
attorneys who choose to advise their clients on the collateral 
consequences of their guilty pleas. The Supreme Court has not yet 
defined the scope of the Sixth Amendment in this respect, so the Sixth 
Amendment may indeed protect criminal defendants from gross 
misadvice on collateral consequences even if it does not require their 
defense lawyers to actively advise on collateral consequences. 
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Petitioner’s Argument 
Padilla claimed that the Sixth Amendment does set a standard for 
legal advice on collateral consequences of guilty pleas, and because 
 44. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Nov. 14, 
2008) (citing several state and federal court decisions that have held affirmative misadvice is a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment). 
 45. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484–85 (listing cases that have concluded that gross 
misadvice of a collateral consequence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).  See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that all of the Federal circuits and 
twenty-one states hold that giving incorrect advice on collateral consequences may qualify as 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 46. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
 47. Id. at 483. 
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there is a standard for advice on collateral consequences, Padilla 
argued that claims like his should be reviewed using the two-part 
Strickland v. Washington test.48 The Sixth Amendment seeks to ensure 
that criminal defendants receive legal representation that meets or 
exceeds a certain standard. Permitting a limited constitutional norm 
that holds that misadvice (as opposed to failure to advise) on 
collateral consequences may constitute a claim under the Sixth 
Amendment allows the courts to safeguard criminal defendant’s 
effective representation. 
Padilla contended that criminal defendants actually get 
“objectively unreasonable” representation when their lawyers 
misadvise them on collateral consequences.49 Gross misadvice 
constitutes objectively unreasonable representation under the Sixth 
Amendment, Padilla contends, because criminal defendants are 
uniquely vulnerable during a criminal prosecutions and trust that 
their attorneys will dispense informed advice.50 In this delicate 
situation, Padilla contends that the Sixth Amendment requires 
criminal defense lawyers’ advice on collateral consequences to meet a 
standard of competence.51 Even if the Sixth Amendment does not 
impose an affirmative obligation on criminal defense attorneys to 
advise their clients on collateral consequences, this standard of 
competence requires that any attorney who chooses to advise his 
client on collateral consequences “must do so competently.”52 
Padilla claimed that Hill v. Lockhart shows that the Supreme 
Court has been willing to consider Sixth Amendment claims based on 
misadvice about collateral consequences. 53 He argued that the Court, 
by using the Strickland test to evaluate the claim in Hill, implicitly 
rejected the notion that the Sixth Amendment did not set any 
standards for advice that criminal defense attorneys choose to give on 
collateral consequences.54 He contended that the Court’s reliance on 
the Strickland test in Hill indicated that Sixth Amendment claims 
based on misadvice about collateral consequences would be reviewed 
for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, not by a per se rule.55 
 48. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 50. 
 49. Id. at 57. 
 50. Id. at 56-57. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 59. 
 53. Id. at 14. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 15. 
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Padilla argued that if the Court is unwilling to hold that misadvice 
on collateral consequences may constitute a basis for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, it should create an exception for 
misadvice on collateral immigration consequences because they are 
so severe.56 Specifically, Padilla asked that deportation consequences 
be analyzed under the Strickland test because deportation 
consequences are uniquely harsh in their immediate effects and 
because defense counsel has the ability to assist a defendant in 
avoiding this consequence throughout the trial and sentencing 
processes.57 For Padilla and other non-citizen defendants who are 
convicted of aggravated felonies, deportation is “virtually a foregone 
conclusion.”58 The automatic and direct nature of deportation is 
inconsistent with the rationale behind excluding collateral 
consequences from counsel’s legal obligations. As Padilla noted, 
deportation is considered such a serious consequence of a guilty plea 
that trial courts in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia 
notify defendants of possible deportation consequences during plea 
hearings.59 
B. Respondent’s Argument 
Kentucky argued that the Sixth Amendment only requires a 
minimum level of competency for advice on the direct consequences 
of the plea, and therefore misadvice on collateral consequences 
cannot be a Sixth Amendment violation.  Noting that trial courts are 
only required to ensure that a defendant understands the direct 
consequences of his guilty plea,60 Kentucky argued that the Sixth 
Amendment only sets standards for legal advice on direct 
consequences of a plea.61 Kentucky contended that interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment as imposing standards for advice on possible 
collateral consequences “would be overly burdensome and wholly 
impractical” because defense counsel would then have a duty to 
ascertain and apply the vast range of collateral consequences to the 
client.62 
 56. Id. at 50. 
 57. Id. at 51. 
 58. Id. at 53. 
 59. Id. at 54. 
 60. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 26, at 7. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. See id. at 17-18 (noting that collateral consequences can include familial consequences, 
property forfeiture, and the loss of the ability to purchase alcohol). 
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Kentucky also argued that there was “no legal or rational basis” 
for maintaining that the Sixth Amendment does not require advice on 
collateral consequences but sets a standard for such advice when it 
occurs.63 It contended that Padilla’s reliance on Hill v. Lockhart was 
misplaced because that case did not explicitly hold or even address 
whether misadvice on collateral consequences could be ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.64 
C. Oral Arguments 
At oral argument, the Court appeared sympathetic to Padilla’s 
plight, yet concerned about limiting the scope of its ruling. 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor focused on deportation as 
a unique consequence of a guilty plea and reflected on the difficulty 
of ensuring that a defendant makes an informed, strategic choice. 
Justice Ginsburg asked “why wouldn’t a lawyer whose client is an 
alien have an obligation, when there is an aggravated felony as the 
charge, to say: This will be the consequence?”65 Justice Sotomayor also 
commented that a defendant deserves to make a strategic and well-
informed choice on whether to plead guilty or go to trial.66 She 
hypothesized that an alien may choose to go to trial and risk serving a 
longer sentence because he could serve the sentence in the United 
States and avoid “starv[ing] to death” in his home country.67 
Justice Scalia doubted the Court’s ability to craft an exception 
solely for deportation, commenting that one defendant might be 
interested in advice on keeping custody of his children, while another 
defendant may be very concerned about losing his truck, “which is his 
main means of livelihood.”68 Justice Scalia questioned whether it 
would be possible to follow the petitioner’s suggestion to declare 
deportation a special consequence and “leave for another day” other 
consequences.69 Justice Scalia’s concerns highlight the Court’s 
probable unwillingness to set out special standards for advice on 
collateral consequences like deportation without treating collateral 
 63. See id. at 10 (noting that the cases Padilla offered in Petitioner’s Brief do not contain 
“any legal or rational basis” for establishing that misadvice regarding collateral consequences 
may result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment). 
 64. Id. at 23. 
 65. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Oct. 13, 
2009). 
 66. Id. at 35. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 7. 
 69. Id. 
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consequences in general. 
Although he agreed with Padilla’s counsel that deportation is a 
severe consequence for someone calling the United States home, 
Justice Alito asked whether courts would be faced with an 
unworkable standard if the Supreme Court holds that misadvice on 
collateral consequences is a Sixth Amendment violation. If a 
defendant claims that defense counsel dispensed advice on collateral 
consequences, but there is no documentation of this advice, how will 
courts decided whether counsel actually said anything regarding 
collateral consequences? In the same vein as Kentucky’s argument 
that it would be impractical to require counsel to cover all possible 
consequences of a guilty plea, Justice Alito also pictured a public 
defender overburdened and “unable to remember what, if anything, 
was said about the immigration consequences” of a past case 
resurrected for post-conviction relief.70 
D. Likely Disposition 
The Supreme Court will likely hold that the Sixth Amendment 
does not require defense counsel to advise clients on the collateral 
consequences of guilty pleas, but that it does require counsel that 
chooses to advise clients on the collateral consequences of guilty pleas 
not to provide gross misadvice.71 Such a holding will dispose of the 
need to make a special Sixth Amendment rule for misadvice about 
deportation resulting from a guilty plea. Such a special rule would be 
untenable because there is no clear way to distinguish deportation 
from other serious collateral consequences, such as parole eligibility 
and loss of custody. 
Allowing defendants to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
for misadvice regarding collateral consequences would not result in a 
new norm for competent counsel. Instead, courts, in permitting such 
claims, would be able to hold lawyers accountable to preexisting 
standards for the advice that they already chose to give. Nor would 
such a standard lead courts to overturn many guilty pleas: even if 
misadvice is a basis for a Strickland claim, defendants must still show 
that the misadvice prejudiced them. 
Even if the Court finds that the misadvice Padilla received could 
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court might still hold 
 70. Id. at 10. 
 71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 6, at 5–7. 
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that Padilla does not have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
The Court could refuse to send the case back to Kentucky for an 
evidentiary hearing on the grounds that Padilla cannot show that his 
attorney’s misadvice prejudiced his decision to plead guilty. Though 
such an outcome is possible, it seems unlikely because it is unclear 
from the record whether Padilla can show whether misadvice 
prejudiced his decision to plead guilty. 
 
